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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the House of Lords’ decision in the Gorringe case, there can be 
no reason for imposing a duty of care in negligence on a public authority 
that would not also count as a reason for imposing a duty of care on a 
private person. In this context assumption of responsibility, as the primary 
concept used to explain the imposition of a duty of care in novel 
situations, acquires great importance. This article explores whether the 
concept’s application to public authorities produces satisfactory results 
and, finding that it does not, concludes that this underlines the folly of 
insisting that public authorities must be treated in the same way as private 
persons. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The tort liability of public authorities in English law is sometimes said 
to be underpinned by “Dicey’s equality principle”, the principle that 
public authorities are to be treated in exactly the same way as private 
persons. 1  Between the House of Lords’ decision in Anns v Merton 
Borough Council2  and its decision in Gorringe v Calderdale Borough 
Council, 3  this assertion was of doubtful accuracy. Anns appeared to 
establish that a body’s subjection to the kind of duty or its possession of 
the kind of power characteristic of a public authority was a reason 
(although not a conclusive one) to impose on it a duty of care. The case 
thus implied the existence of a form of negligence liability special to 
public authorities and this implication remained a feature of the case law 
                                                     
* School of Law, University of Essex. Email: tomc@essex.ac.uk 
1 See P Cane, ‘Damages in Public Law’ (1999) 9 Otago Law Review 489, 490. 
2 [1978] AC 728. 
3 [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057. 
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for a quarter of a century afterwards. In Gorringe, however, it was 
rejected. Gorringe is authority for the proposition that the presence of a 
statutory power or duty is never a reason for imposing a duty of care and 
the practical effect of this is to return the law to a state in which it 
approximates Dicey’s principle much more closely. 
One possible response to this turn in the law is to consider it in the 
context of the wider question of the principle’s legitimacy. Critics argue 
on a variety of grounds that justice demands some specialized form of 
administrative liability (although this need not, of course, take the form of 
a specialized variant of the tort of negligence).4 Defenders of the present 
dispensation either approve of Dicey’s principle or are pleased to see 
negligence confined to what they think of as its traditional role of 
providing redress for the kinds of wrong that private persons are capable 
of committing.5 
A second possible response, however, is to examine in detail how the 
law of negligence can be made to apply to public authorities once the 
option of basing a duty of care on a statutory power or duty is removed. 
This means exploring how a set of concepts developed in order to 
determine whether there should be a duty of care where the defendant is a 
private person can be made to do the same where the defendant is a public 
authority. Such concepts apply easily enough, of course, where a public 
authority performs an act identical in kind to one that might be performed 
by a private person, as where one of its employees carelessly inflicts 
physical injury on a member of the public. But their application becomes 
more difficult where a public authority causes harm by performing acts 
lacking an obvious private equivalent such as providing or failing to 
provide welfare services or exercising regulatory powers. A number of 
supporters of the current law have explored how the concepts in question 
                                                     
4 Post-Gorringe assertions of this view are to be found in T Cornford, Towards a 
Public Law of Tort (Aldershot 2008) and the Law Commission, Administrative 
Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen (Law Comm CP No 187). Dicey’s 
principle has recently been questioned in S Tofaris and S Steel, ‘Negligence 
Liability for Omissions and the Police’ (2016) 75 CLJ 128, 136. 
5 Notable articles approving of the change in the law wrought by Gorringe are S 
Bailey, ‘Public Authority Liability in Negligence: the Continued Search for 
Coherence’ (2006) 26 LS 155 and D Nolan, ‘The Liability of Public Authorities 
for Failing to Confer Benefits’ (2011) 127 LQR 260. Gorringe also consorts well 
with the view of the law promoted by the rights theorists Robert Stevens and 
Allan Beever: see R Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford 2007) ch 10; A Beever, 
Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford 2007) ch 9. 
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apply to public authorities. 6  Their conclusion, or perhaps better, their 
underlying assumption is that the application of these concepts can 
produce a body of law that is coherent and in conformity with generally 
accepted notions of fairness. As a critic of the current law, my view is the 
reverse: careful examination of the application to public authorities of 
concepts developed for the purpose of determining the incidence of the 
duty of care in relation to private persons tends to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of the current law and the folly of ignoring the public nature 
of public authorities. Detailed consideration of the workability of the 
concepts currently employed in dealing with public authority cases thus 
provides another line of attack for those who regard Dicey’s equality 
principle as misconceived and an anachronism. 
In the present article I adopt this line of attack and since the concept 
most commonly used in English law for determining the incidence of the 
duty of care in novel cases involving private persons – and hence also in 
cases involving public authorities – is assumption of responsibility, I 
make it my focus.7 The questions I shall seek to address are: firstly, how 
far can the concept of assumption of responsibility take us in explaining 
the incidence of the duty of care in cases involving public authorities; and 
secondly, if it cannot provide a satisfactory rationale for the current case 
law, might its consistent application provide us with something better. 
The answer I give to both questions will be negative: the concept does a 
poor job of explaining the existing law and if one were to try to create a 
better case law by applying it with rigour and consistency the result would 
be a body of law in which the incidence of the duty of care would be far 
more extensive than anything envisaged by the concept’s proponents but 
which at the same time contained glaring inconsistencies. Far from 
providing a workable alternative to the previous practice of basing a duty 
of care on statutory powers or duties, I shall suggest, the attempt to make 
use of assumption of responsibility tends to point us back towards forms 
of liability that explicitly acknowledge the public nature of public 
authorities. 
                                                     
6 See for example Nolan (n 5); R Bagshaw and N McBride, Tort Law (4th ed, 
Harlow 2012). 
7 I believe similar arguments to those I shall make in relation to assumption of 
responsibility can be made in relation to other concepts intended to apply 
indifferently to both private and public defendants in determining the incidence 
of the duty of care: see further (n 87). Space precludes examination of these 
concepts. 
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The plan of the article is as follows. Firstly, I attempt to sum up in a 
few propositions the current state of the law on the negligence liability of 
public authorities. Secondly, I define how I shall be using the expression 
“assumption of responsibility” in the rest of the article. Thirdly, I examine 
the application of the concept to a variety of types of public authority 
activity. In doing so, I consider both its capacity to explain the existing 
pattern of outcomes and its potential usefulness in creating a more 
defensible pattern of outcomes. Fourthly, I conclude in the terms outlined 
above. 
 
2 THE NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY OF PUBLIC 
AUTHORITIES: THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
 
The current state of the law can, I believe, be summed up in a few 
propositions. The first does not pertain specifically to negligence but 
forms a general background and is worth stating for that reason. This is 
that English law contains no general principle of administrative liability; 
or, in other words, there is no general principle that entitles an individual 
to damages where unlawful administrative action causes that individual 
harm.8 
The second is that the existence of a duty of care in negligence can 
never be based simply on the fact that a public authority possesses a 
particular statutory power or is subject to a particular statutory duty.9 This 
proposition is usually expressed, as I have done, by reference to statutory 
powers and duties but could perhaps be extended so as to encompass the 
case in which an authority – for example a servant of the Crown or a 
police officer – has public law powers or duties that are not statutory in 
origin. The proposition would then be that an authority’s public law 
powers and duties do not, without more, give rise to a private law duty of 
care.10 
                                                     
8  More or less explicit statements to this effect are to be found from Lord 
Wilberforce in Hoffman-la-Roche v Secretary of State for Trade [1975] AC 295 
[358-59] and more recently by Sedley LJ in Mohammed and others v Home 
Office [2011] EWCA Civ 351; [2011] 1 WLR 2862 [61]. For a general overview 
of the obstacles to gaining reparation for harms done by public authorities see the 
Law Commission (n 4) especially pt 4.  
9 Gorringe (n 3) especially [32] (Lord Hoffmann), [71] (Lord Scott). 
10 There is no authority to either support or undermine this more general, non-
statutory form of the proposition, however. 
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The third proposition is that a public authority may, nonetheless, owe 
a duty of care in those circumstances in which a private person 
analogously placed would do so.11 An authority may thus owe a duty of 
care when performing a function that, according to established case law, 
gives rise to a duty of care when performed by a private person; or where 
its actions satisfy the threefold Caparo test in circumstances in which a 
private person performing the same actions would do so; and it may also 
do so if it can be said to have assumed a responsibility towards the 
claimant.12  
The fourth proposition is that where there are arguable grounds for 
finding a duty of care, the putative duty should be excluded if it would be 
in conflict with other duties to which the defendant public authority is 
subject. This general proposition can be analyzed in turn into two sub-
propositions, of which one corresponds to a general tendency while the 
other represents a strict rule. The first sub-proposition concerns cases in 
which the proposed duty of care would be a duty vis-a-vis the claimant to 
deliver the benefit that the defendant authority is under a public law duty 
to deliver to members of the public generally. In such cases, the tendency 
is to say that a duty of care should be excluded because it might conflict 
with the authority’s ability to perform its duties to the public as a whole.13 
The second sub-proposition is that where an authority possesses a 
power for the purpose of protecting some particular class of person it is 
inappropriate to impose a duty of care towards some other class of person 
who might be harmed by the power’s exercise. This type of argument is 
                                                     
11 This has been the law at least since Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v Gibbs 
(1866) LR 1 HL 93.  
12 See further below. 
13 So, for example, the exclusionary rule enunciated in Hill v Chief Constable of 
West Yorkshire [1989] AC 53 excludes a duty of care on the part of the police 
towards potential victims of crime on the ground that this would interfere with 
the wider duties they owe to the public as a whole. Since the overruling of the 
ECtHR’s judgment in Osman v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 245, [1999] FLR 193, the 
rule in Hill has been reasserted in a number of other cases, for example: Brooks v 
Metropolitan Police Commissioner [2005] UKHL 24, [2005] 1 WLR 1495; Smith 
v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] 1 AC 225; An 
Informer v Chief Constable [2012] EWCA Civ 197, [2013] QB 579; Michael v 
Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] 2 WLR 343. For 
instances of the application of the first sub-proposition outside the police context, 
see: Mitchell v Glasgow City Council [2009] UKHL 11, [2009] AC 874; X v 
Hounslow London Borough Council [2009] EWCA Civ 286, [2010] HLR 4. 
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foreshadowed in a number of earlier decisions14 but attains the status of a 
general rule in Jain v Trent Strategic Health Authority15 where Lord Scott 
(with whom the other members of the House agreed) said the following: 
 
“...where action is taken by a state authority under statutory 
powers designed for the benefit or protection of a particular class 
of persons, a tortious duty of care will not be held to be owed by 
the state authority to others whose interests may be adversely 
affected by an exercise of the statutory power. The reason is that 
the imposition of such a duty would or might inhibit the exercise 
of the statutory powers and be potentially adverse to the interests 
of the class of persons the powers were designed to benefit or 
protect, thereby putting at risk the achievement of their statutory 
purpose.”16 
 
The fifth proposition is that a duty of care on the part of a public 
authority may also be excluded on policy grounds other than those 
mentioned in connection with the fourth proposition. The fourth 
proposition concerns the theoretical compatibility of public and private 
law duties. The fifth proposition concerns the effects of a duty of care on 
the practical ability of a public authority to fulfil its duties. The policy 
consideration typically falling under this head is that imposition of a duty 
of care will lead to overkill or defensive practice and thus inhibit an 
authority’s ability to carry out its wider duties. Since the Osman case, the 
courts have greatly reduced their reliance on such considerations in the 
face of the criticism that they were being used in blanket fashion and 
without adequate evidence. 17  Nonetheless, they have not disappeared 
                                                     
14 Eg Caparo v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605; Harris v Evans [1998] 1 WLR 1285; 
Reeman v Department of Transport [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 648; D v East 
Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust [2005] UKHL 23, [2005] 2 AC 373.  
15  [2009] UKHL 4, [2009] 2 WLR 248. The conflict here was between the 
defendant authority’s duty to protect residents of care homes and the duty of care 
alleged to be owed to the claimant care home owners. 
16 Ibid [28]. 
17 Osman v UK (2000) 29 EHRR 245, [1999] FLR 193. The criticisms made of 
the English courts in this regard by the ECtHR in the Osman case appears to have 
had a lasting effect despite its later overruling. On the turn from policy 
considerations to substantive legal rules as a way of controlling liability in cases 
of public authority negligence see C Booth and D Squires, The Negligence 
Liability of Public Authorities (Oxford 2006) ch 4 especially 4.06, 4.95-98. 
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altogether from the case law as cases on “the Hill immunity” in relation to 
police work show.18  
To the propositions I have just described, one can also add what I 
shall call “the background premise.” This is that the private law principles 
that determine the incidence of the duty of care in negligence can never be 
so extended as to require or justify the imposition of a duty of care in 
relation to the most purely public law functions of public authorities, 
those involving the exercise of powers to determine the rights or 
entitlements of citizens. 19  As the name I have given it implies, the 
background premise is generally assumed to be so obvious as not to need 
stating.20 As a result, no justification is ever offered for it but, as I shall 
argue below, it is not at all clear that it can be justified. 
Lastly, before passing on to consider the concept of assumption of 
responsibility, one more feature of the case law is worth considering, the 
existence of a strong dissident strain of authority. From the time of Anns 
onward, an influential minority of judges - Lords Wilberforce, 21 
Bingham,22 Woolf23 and to a lesser extent Lords Nicholls,24 Slynn25 and 
                                                     
18 See further below. 
19 In the typology below of types of public authority to case in relation to which 
assumption of responsibility might apply, I call these “legal determination” cases. 
20 An indicator of the existence of the premise in the case law is the tendency in 
the pre-Gorringe case law – not altogether extinguished - to adopt barriers to 
liability that distinguish sharply between the public and private parts of a public 
authorities functions: the policy/operations distinction; the requirements that an 
act be ultra vires or justiciable before liability can arise. In reform proposals the 
premise is reflected in the idea that two kinds of public authority liability are 
required, one belonging to private and the other to public law: see Administrative 
Justice: Some Necessary Reforms Report of the Committee of the JUSTICE-All 
Souls Review of Administrative Law in the UK (1988) ch 11; the Law 
Commission (n 4) pt 4. 
21 In Anns itself and see his remarks in Hoffmann-La Roche (n 8) [358-59]. 
22 See his lordship’s judgment in the Court of Appeal in X v Bedfordshire [1995] 
AC 633 above and his dissenting judgments in D v East Berkshire [2005] UKHL 
23, [2005] 2 AC 373 and Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex (n 13). 
23 See Larner v Solihull Metropolitan Borough Council [2001] RTR 32 above, 
Kent v Griffiths [2001] QB 36 (CA). 
24 See his lordship’s dissenting judgment in Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923 (HL). 
His lordship seems to have recanted somewhat in D v East Berkshire (n 14). 
25 See Barrett v Enfield LBC [1999] 3 WLR 79 (HL) and Phelps v Hillingdon 
LBC [2000] 3 WLR 776. 
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Steyn26 – has persistently argued in favour of an expanded liability. Their 
reasons for doing so have not always been made explicit but they are well 
expressed by Lord Bingham in an article of 2010:27 
 
“...if a member of the public whom a public service exists to serve 
suffers significant injury or loss through the culpable fault or 
reprehensible failure of that service to act as it should, is it not 
consistent with ethical and, perhaps, democratic principle that the 
many, responsible for funding the service, should bear the cost of 
compensating the victim?” 
 
This way of thinking involves an explicit rejection of the second 
proposition set out above. That it persists can be seen in the judgment of 
the minority in the recent Michael case,28 considered further below. In the 
rest of this article, I shall refer to the principle enunciated by Lord 
Bingham as “the Bingham principle”. 
 
3 ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY 
 
The most strenuous attempts to define assumption of responsibility 
are found not in the case law but in the work of commentators. Since the 
commentators who go to such lengths to define the concept also believe 
that its application – and that of cognate notions – to cases involving 
public authorities can produce a satisfactory law of public authority 
negligence liability, it is worth briefly reviewing these attempts at 
definition.29 On certain points, they are in accord. They agree that in order 
                                                     
26 See his Lordship’s concordant but more pro-liability speech in Gorringe. 
27 Lord Bingham, ‘The Uses of Tort Law’ (2010) 1 JETL 3. 
28 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] 2 
WLR 343. 
29 The commentators whose views I discuss here are: N McBride and A Hughes, 
‘Hedley Byrne in the House of Lords: an Interpretation’ (1995) 15 LS 376; R 
Bagshaw, ‘The Duties of Care of Emergency Service Providers’ [1999] LMCLQ 
71; R Stevens (n 5); D Nolan (n 5); R Bagshaw and N McBride (n 6). To avoid 
the confusions associated with the expression “assumption of responsibility”, use 
of it is avoided in the article by McBride and Hughes and in Bagshaw and 
McBride’s book. For the sake of convenience, I overlook this nuance here. In 
each work, a principle is advanced that is intended to explain some, at least, of 
the decisions in which the courts used the expression. 
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to assume responsibility, the defendant must perform some positive act.30 
They agree too that the question of whether or not the defendant has 
assumed a responsibility toward the claimant is an objective one i.e. that 
the existence of an assumption of responsibility does not depend on there 
being an intention on the defendant’s part to incur an obligation – legal or 
otherwise – towards the claimant. A corollary of this is that, while the 
judges in Hedley Byrne and in some other early cases talked of voluntary 
assumption of responsibility, assumption of responsibility is now taken to 
be voluntary in only a very restricted sense.31 
The differences between the various accounts of the concept relate to 
the question of whether or not there must be explicit dealings or 
“mutuality” between defendant and claimant and whether it is necessary 
for the claimant to have relied on the defendant’s undertaking. A number 
of writers have insisted that mutuality and reliance are not prerequisites of 
assumption of responsibility. They are not, however, in precise agreement 
as to what are prerequisites. Stevens states that “[t]he foreseeable 
possibility of detriment, whether by reliance of the claimant or a third 
party, is relevant and will commonly be decisive in determining whether, 
as a matter of construction, the defendant has by his actions implicitly 
assumed responsibility towards the claimant.”32 Nolan appears to follow 
him in this. 33  McBride and Hughes 34  and Bagshaw 35  emphasize a 
                                                     
30 cf Lord Hoffmann in Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank 
[2006] UKHL 28, [2007] 1 AC 181 [38]: “the notion of assumption of 
responsibility serves a … useful purpose in drawing attention to the fact that a 
duty of care is ordinarily generated by something which the defendant has 
decided to do”. 
31 As Nolan puts it, “[t]he better view, which was expressed by Lord Walker of 
Gestingthorpe in the Customs and Excise Commissioners case, is that the 
undertaking is voluntary because it is ‘conscious’, ‘considered’ or ‘deliberate’”. 
See ‘The Liability of Public Authorities for Failing to Confer Benefits’ (n 5) 283 
and Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank Plc (n 30) [73]. 
32 Stevens (n 5) 14. 
33 Nolan (n 5) 281. A similar view of assumption of responsibility appears also to 
be taken by Allan Beever (n 5) ch 8. 
34 See McBride and Hughes (n 29) 284: “[t]he defendant has accepted power over 
the plaintiff knowing that he is expected to use reasonable care and skill in 
exercising that power. He has failed to do so and the plaintiff has suffered loss as 
a result.” I assume that the defendant having power over the claimant entails 
dependence on the part of the claimant. 
35 Bagshaw ‘The Duties of Care’ (n 29) 77: “at the very least the defendant must 
undertake a task which he holds himself out as having special skill and 
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combination of dependence on the part of the claimant and skill and 
knowledge of the claimant’s dependence on the part of the defendant. 
Bagshaw, Stevens and Nolan all point, as illustrating the absence of the 
need for reliance, to the example of the doctor who comes to the aid of an 
unconscious patient. The doctor assumes responsibility for treating the 
patient with reasonable care despite the patient being in no position to 
consciously rely on the treatment. 
A principle significantly different from any of those discussed in the 
previous paragraph has been advanced by Bagshaw and McBride in their 
text book. This is that “if A has indicated to B that B can safely rely on 
him to perform a particular task with a certain degree of care and skill and 
B has so relied on A, A will owe B a duty to perform that task with that 
degree of care and skill”.36 Here actual reliance is central. Since, however, 
this principle can explain only a small proportion of the cases in which 
assumption of responsibility is invoked, the authors set out a number of 
other principles to explain the remaining cases. The most important of 
these is a principle of “severe dependency”.37 This states that “if A knows 
that B’s future will be ruined if he does a positive act X, then A will owe 
B a duty to take care not to do X”.38 The authors use it to explain Spring v 
Guardian Assurance,39 Phelps v Hillingdon LBC40  and Smith v Eric S 
Bush,41 and also what they call cases of “business sterilisation”. These are 
cases in which the defendant acts in such a way as to cause the 
foreseeable destruction of the claimant’s business and may occur where 
the defendant is a regulatory authority able to damage the claimant by the 
                                                                                                                        
competence to undertake, and the task must be one which he knows the plaintiff 
is dependent on being done with reasonable skill and competence.” 
36 Bagshaw and McBride Tort Law (n 6) 180. This is what the authors call “the 
extended principle in Hedley Byrne” as opposed to “the basic principle in Hedley 
Byrne”, set out at 175, which relates purely to advice. The former presumably 
includes or implies the latter. 
37  Other principles proposed by Bagshaw and McBride (n 6) 200-06) are a 
principle of liability for negligent intermeddling, invoked to explain White v 
Jones [1995] 2 AC 207, a principle of liability for expenses incurred as a result of 
putting property in danger, invoked to explain the Greystoke Castle [1947] AC 
265, and a principle of liability for interfering with intangible property, invoked 
to explain Minister of Housing and Local Government v Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223. 
38 Ibid 97.  
39 [1995] 2 AC 296. 
40 n 35. 
41 Smith v Eric S Bush, Harris v Wyre Forest DC [1990] 1 AC 831. 
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use of its coercive powers42 or where the defendant is a private person 
able to harm the claimant by other means.43 
In sum, these attempts to make sense of the case law in which the 
concept of assumption of responsibility is used yields two types of 
principle. The first requires explicit dealing and mutuality between the 
parties. The second does not but requires instead foreseeable detriment 
flowing from the reliance of the claimant or a third party or a combination 
of dependence on the part of the claimant with knowledge of that 
dependence on the part of the defendant.  
All the versions I have described of these principles require a positive 
act and the assertion of some knowledge or skill on the part of the 
defendant and take the question of whether there is an assumption of 
responsibility to be an objective one in the sense explained above. 
From the point of view of the argument I wish to make in this article, 
it is the elements that these different competing conceptions of 
assumption of responsibility have in common that are important. Little 
turns on the differences, which all concern the extent to which the 
defendant can he held to have assumed a responsibility towards parties 
with whom she has no direct dealings or of whom she has limited 
knowledge.44 At the same time, the more wide-ranging and the greater the 
explanatory power of the version of the concept I adopt, the more 
convincingly will my argument (if successful) achieve its aim of 
demonstrating the concept’s unsuitedness to determining the incidence of 
the duty of care in relation to public authorities. I therefore, and at the risk 
of solecism, propose to use the expression “assumption of responsibility” 
as an umbrella term covering all the principles and sub-principles I have 
described in this section. 
A further question concerns the relationship between assumption of 
responsibility and policy considerations limiting the incidence of the duty 
                                                     
42 As in Harris v Evans (n 14) or Jain v Trent Strategic Health Authority (n 15). 
43 As in the Australian case of Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180 where 
the defendant sold diseased potato seeds to farmers whose farm was close to the 
claimants’ potato farm with the result that the claimants’ potatoes fell foul of a 
legal prohibition on the sale of potatoes from an area where there were diseased 
potatoes. The claimants sued successfully on the basis of the economic loss they 
suffered. 
44 Nearly every application of the concept I consider below is consistent with the 
requirement that there be direct dealings between the parties. In the only one that 
is not – Minister for Housing and Local Government v Sharp (n 37) – the 
defendant had direct dealings with a third party in the knowledge that careless 
performance of the task he had undertaken would harm the claimant. 
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of care. On the one hand, the finding of an assumption of responsibility is 
sometimes taken to obviate the need to consider questions of policy and 
hence to satisfy by itself the fair, just and reasonable limb of the Caparo 
test.45 On the other hand, in some cases, notably those concerning the 
duties of the police towards members of the public, the existence of an 
assumption of responsibility is treated as an indicator in favour of a duty 
of care than can be outweighed by contrary policy considerations.46 The 
commentators who have insisted most strongly on the meaningfulness of 
the family of concepts I have grouped together under the title “assumption 
of responsibility” do so because they think policy considerations have no 
place in the law of negligence. On the basis of the strategy enunciated 
above of adopting the form of the concept with the greatest explanatory 
power, however, I shall treat the presence of an assumption of 
responsibility as an indicator in favour of liability capable of being 
overridden both by the consequential factors usually referred to as policy 
considerations and by the restrictive principles in the fourth proposition 
described in section I above. 
Finally, it has been argued, notably by Barker, that the courts use 
different versions of the concept of assumption of responsibility, no one 
of which is capable of explaining all the cases, and switch back and forth 
between them as a way of accommodating concealed policy concerns.47 In 
the light of this, it might be objected that there is no point in examining 
the application of the concept to public authorities since it cannot even 
explain the cases in which it is used in relation to private defendants. 
There are two answers to this objection. The first is that by adopting the 
position that there is an assumption of responsibility where any one of the 
proposed tests is satisfied, I avoid the problem that arises where the courts 
speak of the concept as if it were a unitary one while meaning different 
things by it on different occasions. The second concerns the formalism or 
conceptualism of the current law. As I have suggested above, the current 
                                                     
45 See Henderson v Merrett Syndicates [1995] 2 AC 145 [181D] (Lord Goff); 
Brooks v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (n 13) [29] (Lord Steyn). 
46 See the cases referred to at notes 48-51. 
47 See K Barker, ‘Unreliable Assumptions in the Law of Negligence’ (1993) 109 
LQR 461; K Barker, ‘Wielding Occam’s Razor: Pruning Strategies for Economic 
Loss’ (2006) 26 OJLS 289. This implies, of course, that the concept of 
assumption of responsibility is not really distinct from the broader concept of 
proximity. Many dicta suggesting this are to be found in the case law. More 
recent academic assertions of this view are to be found in K Barker, R Grantham 
and W Swain (eds), The Law of Misstatements: 50 Years on from Hedley Byrne v 
Heller (Hart, 2015). 
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approach of the courts to the negligence liability of public authorities 
substitutes conceptual barriers to duties of care for the policy based 
barriers that were more common in the pre-Gorringe case law. At the 
same time, the supporters of this change in the law propose a highly 
conceptual or formalistic method for determining the incidence of the 
duty of care in relation to public authorities via the use of concepts such 
as assumption of responsibility. If this approach can be shown not to 
succeed in its own terms, then the unsatisfactory nature of the current law 
will be exposed, notwithstanding the concept’s disutility in the kinds of 
case in which it was originally developed. 
 
4 THE APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 
ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY TO PUBLIC 
AUTHORITIES 
 
I turn then to consider how the concept of assumption of 
responsibility can be applied to various types of case involving public 
authorities. The types I shall consider are (as I shall call them) protection 
cases, cases involving the giving of advice or information, rescue cases, 
professional cases and cases involving legal determination of the rights or 
entitlements of private persons. The meaning of these categories will 
become clearer below. I arrange them according to how successfully the 
concept of assumption of responsibility can be applied beginning with 
those to which it can be applied most successfully and ending with those 
to which it can be applied least successfully. 
Two difficulties that arise from the attempt to apply the concept of 
assumption of responsibility are worth outlining in general terms before 
examining the particular types of case. The first concerns omissions. As 
we have seen, it is a requirement of the concept that, in order to incur a 
duty of care, a defendant must perform some positive act that brings her 
into a relationship with the claimant. When this requirement is applied to 
public authorities, however, it tends to produce unsatisfactory results. 
Where the defendant is a private person, it makes sense to subject her to a 
duty where she positively undertakes to assist the claimant and not to 
subject her to a duty where she makes no such positive undertaking. 
Where the defendant is a public authority which exists to serve a citizen, 
to draw a distinction between the case in which the authority makes some 
positive undertaking and the case in which it does not may make less 
sense. As a matter of public law or of moral obligation, the authority may 
be under an obligation in both cases and to insist on the distinction when 
making a decision as to when to order the payment of compensation may 
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lead to a pattern of decisions that would strike most people as 
indefensible. 
The second difficulty arises from the need to distinguish the class of 
cases in which a public authority may be held to have assumed a 
responsibility to the claimant from the class of cases in which a public 
authority causes harm to a citizen or citizens by the failure to exercise its 
powers properly. We may think of the latter class of cases as defined by 
the Bingham principle i.e. as being the class of cases in which a member 
of the public whom a public service exists to serve suffers significant 
injury or loss through the culpable fault or reprehensible failure of that 
service to act as it should. The Bingham principle does not represent the 
law. As described above, this discourages the finding of a duty of care in 
relation to most public authority functions. One would thus expect that the 
class of cases in which a public authority could be held to have assumed 
responsibility toward the claimant would be a much smaller one than the 
class of cases defined by the Bingham principle. But it is not so simple in 
practice.  
A public service, to use Lord Bingham’s terminology, exists to serve a 
citizen. Where it fails reprehensibly to act as it should and thereby causes 
loss to the citizen, the law presently puts considerable obstacles in the 
way of any claim to compensation based on negligence. Most importantly, 
as per proposition two above, the fact that the service exists to provide a 
service to a citizen – that it has statutory powers that enable it to do so and 
is subject to statutory target duties that require it to do so – cannot be a 
reason for imposing a duty of care. Yet if a person becomes subject to a 
duty of care where she purports to be able to perform a task with skill and 
knows that another is likely to depend on her so performing the task or 
where she indicates to another that the other can safely rely on her 
performing a task with skill and the other does so rely, then public 
authorities must very often be subject to duties of care even and especially 
where the task they are performing is the one that they exist to perform. 
The doctrine of assumption of responsibility may thus require a duty of 
care in exactly the circumstances in which the wider framework 
governing the negligence liability of public authorities discourages it.  
 
4.1 Protection Cases 
 
I begin with what is really a residual class of cases. It consists of cases 
in which a public authority is or is alleged to be under an obligation to 
protect citizens from some – usually physical - danger to their safety. It is 
distinct from what I call below “professional cases” in that the public 
authority employees involved are not usually professionals; and from 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
69 
what I call below “rescue cases” in that the authority in question is not 
apprised of the danger at exactly the moment that it is about to occur. Into 
this class fall many types of police case, for example: cases in which the 
police are aware of the activities of a criminal who poses a threat to 
members of the category of persons to which the claimant belongs;48 cases 
in which the police are aware of a specific threat to the claimant’s safety 
from a particular person;49 cases in which the claimant is a witness and the 
police are alleged to owe a duty to take care to conceal her identity and to 
protect her from violence;50 cases in which the claimant is a suspect and 
the police or prosecuting authorities are alleged to owe a duty to take care 
in investigating the case against him.51 Into this class also fall a wide 
variety of other types of case, for example: cases in which highway 
authorities are alleged to owe a duty of care to members of the public to 
avert dangers on the road;52 cases in which local authorities are alleged to 
owe duties to protect their tenants from the depredations of other tenants 
or neighbours; 53  cases in which health authorities are alleged to owe 
duties to protect members of the public from infection.54  
For cases which fall into this residual class, the notion of assumption 
of responsibility does appear to provide a rationale for imposing a duty of 
care in some cases and not others. To take the police cases referred to, for 
example, the idea that the police assume a responsibility towards 
witnesses or informants but not towards members of the public potentially 
endangered by the presence at large of a criminal provides an explanation 
of why there should be a duty of care in the former cases but not in the 
latter. Cases in which the police fail to protect an individual from the 
threat of a particular known individual occupy a point on the spectrum 
between the two types of case referred to in the previous sentence and are 
                                                     
48 Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire (n 13). 
49 Osman v Ferguson [1993] 4 All ER 344 (CA); Van Colle v Chief Constable of 
the Hertfordshire Police [2008] UKHL 50, [2009] AC 225. 
50 Swinney v Chief Constable of Northumbria Police Force [1997] QB 464 (CA). 
51  Welsh v Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police [1993] 1 All ER 692; 
Elguzouli-Daf v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1995] QB 335; 
Brooks v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (n 13). 
52 Stovin v Wise (n 24); Gorringe (n 3). 
53 Mitchell v Glasgow City Council, X v Hounslow London Borough Council, 
both (n 13). 
54  Furnell and another v Flaherty (trading as Goldstone Farm)(Health 
Protection Agency and another, Part 20 defendants) [2013] EWHC 377 (QB), 
[2013] PTSR D20. 
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for that reason especially contentious.55 It would seem very plausible to 
ascribe to a police force which is apprised of and takes some steps to 
protect a claimant from a threat from a particular known individual an 
assumption of responsibility towards the claimant. In the light of this, the 
finding that no duty of care is owed in such cases can only be explained 
by reference to the supposed conflict between the putative duty of care 
and the police’s other obligations. 
 
4.2 Information Cases 
 
Another category in relation to which assumption of responsibility 
appears to serve reasonably well as a mechanism for determining the 
incidence of the duty of care comprises cases in which a public authority 
has power to give advice or information to a citizen and chooses to do so. 
For example, in T v Surrey County Council56 the defendant authority kept 
the name of a particular child minder on the register of child minders it 
was obliged by law to maintain. T’s mother left T in the care of the child 
minder after having sought and received assurances from an employee of 
the authority that the child minder was to be trusted. In fact, on a previous 
occasion, the child minder had caused injury to a child by violent shaking 
and did the same to T. The court held that although the purpose of the 
governing legislation was to ensure that only persons who were fit to act 
as child minders should be registered, it did not give rise to duties to any 
individuals who might rely on the register. The giving of specific 
assurances by the authority to T’s mother was, however, capable of giving 
rise to a duty of care and the assurances constituted negligence 
misstatement. Here the notion of assumption of responsibility (or its 
cognate, negligent misstatement) makes it possible to pick out a particular 
act of the authority as attracting a duty of care where its other related 
activity does not. There is a fine line, however, between cases in which an 
authority merely has a power to give information to a specific individual 
and cases in which, by doing so, it changes the legal position of the 
individual concerned. As we shall see below, the use of assumption of 
responsibility in relation to the latter is more problematic. 
 
 
                                                     
55 Note, in this respect, the dissenting judgment of Lord Bingham in Van Colle (n 
49). 
56 [1994] 4 All ER 448. 
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4.3 Rescue Cases 
 
At time of writing the four leading judgments in rescue cases in 
English law are Capital and Counties PLC v Hampshire CC,57 OLL Ltd v 
Secretary of State for Transport,58 Kent v Griffiths,59 and the more recent 
Michael and others v Chief Constable of South Wales Police.60 In Capital 
and Counties, the Court of Appeal heard appeals in four cases in which 
the fire brigade had been called to fires and failed to put them out. OLL 
concerned the mismanagement by the coastguard of an attempted rescue 
of a party of schoolchildren who had got into trouble at sea. Kent 
concerned the calling of an ambulance whose late arrival led to the 
claimant suffering injuries that she would have avoided if the ambulance 
had arrived timeously. In Michael, a telephone call to the police from a 
woman in danger of imminent violence was wrongly classified with the 
result that the police arrived too late to save her life. 
The role actually played by assumption of responsibility in the court’s 
judgment in each of these cases is fairly limited. The question I wish to 
address, however, is whether the concept can be used nonetheless to 
explain the pattern of outcomes that occurred. Donal Nolan has attempted 
to rationalise the differing outcomes of rescue cases concerning the 
ambulance service, fire brigade and police using a conception of 
assumption of responsibility as involving the voluntary acceptance of an 
obligation by the defendant combined with the foreseeable possibility of 
detrimental reliance on the part of the claimant.61 On this view, the reason 
why there is an assumption of responsibility and hence a duty of care 
when an injured person summons an ambulance but none where the fire 
brigade is summoned to put out a fire or the police are summoned to the 
scene of an emergency is that a person who summons an ambulance is 
likely to renounce the alternative means of transport available to her 
whereas a person who summons the other emergency services is likely to 
have no other means of assistance to renounce. The paradoxical 
consequence of this reasoning, however, is that the more absolutely 
dependent a citizen is on the protection provided by a public authority, the 
less likely the authority is to owe her a duty of care. 62  It would 
                                                     
57 [1997] QB 1004 (CA). 
58 [1997] 3 All ER 897 (QB). 
59 [2001] QB 36, [2000] 2 WLR 1158 (CA).  
60 [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] 2 WLR 343. 
61 Nolan (n 5) 281. 
62 cf N McBride, ‘Michael and the Future of Tort Law’ (2016) 32 PN 14-31. 
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presumably mean, for example, that someone who lived on a remote 
island and who could only be brought to hospital by air ambulance would 
be owed no duty of care if she called the ambulance service whereas if she 
lived in a busy town and called the ambulance service, she would be owed 
a duty. 
On the most plausible interpretation of how assumption of 
responsibility should apply to rescue services, I suggest, all the services I 
have referred to would be held to have assumed a responsibility and hence 
to owe a duty of care upon acceptance of an emergency call. Any person 
who calls one of these services in an emergency is likely to rely on the 
service and if a call is made on a person’s behalf and she is unaware of it 
(as happens, for example, if a third party makes a call to the ambulance 
service to rescue an unconscious person), she is very likely to depend on 
the service fulfilling its function with reasonable care.63  
This leads us naturally to question whether this is a satisfactory 
pattern of outcomes? Policy fears about the supposed strain on the rescue 
services aside, I suggest it is; but with one important caveat. As noted 
above, however one interprets assumption of responsibility, it seems to 
require that the defendant perform some positive act that can be treated as 
constituting acceptance of an obligation towards the claimant. In rescue 
cases, given the general expectation that rescue services will attempt to 
assist people who ask for their help, the acceptance of the call for help 
will usually be enough to constitute such a positive act. But suppose a 
service’s phone operator does not answer the call or tells the caller that no 
assistance will be forthcoming in circumstances where it is quite 
unreasonable to do so, for example where the service in question is the 
fire brigade and is perfectly capable of coming to the caller’s aid and has 
at the time in question no competing demands for its assistance.64 Suppose 
further that the caller suffers harm that would probably have been avoided 
if the fire brigade has attended the fire. It makes no sense, I suggest, to 
differentiate a case such as this by denying the existence of a duty of care 
if one would be found in the case in which the phone operator allowed the 
caller to believe that the fire brigade would attend. 
 
                                                     
63 Even if we accept the argument that the fire brigade should not be under a duty 
to answer emergency calls because this duty would conflict with its wider 
obligations, we are nonetheless left with a pattern other than the actual one. 
64 cf D Brodie, ‘Public Authority Liability: the Scottish Approach’ (2007) 11 
Edin LR 254, 256. 
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4.4 Professional Cases 
 
The offer of help – explicit or implicit – to a member of the public by 
a qualified professional is the paradigm example of assumption of 
responsibility. For this reason, one would expect the concept to apply 
most easily in those cases in which the claimant’s complaint against a 
public authority can be treated as a complaint about the failure of a 
professional person employed by the authority to provide the relevant 
service. This expectation is, to some extent, borne out by the case law. 
Bodies within the NHS can be held vicariously liable for the failure of the 
doctors working for them to provide the treatment expected; 65  local 
authorities can be held liable for the negligent misstatements of the 
surveyors they employ;66 and education authorities can be held liable for 
the failure of the teachers and educational psychologists they employ to 
respectively provide adequate education or correct diagnosis for children 
with special educational needs.67 It is arguable also that local authorities 
can be held liable for the omissions of the professionals they employ in 
the field of child protection.68 
A difficulty with the idea that public authorities can be held 
vicariously liable for the acts of professionals they employ is that it, too, 
can produce obvious anomalies. Where a local education authority or the 
social services department of a local authority causes harm to children, it 
may be because the professionals who work for the authority have failed 
in their professional duty – the head master of a school may have failed to 
provide a child with appropriate education, social workers may have 
failed to take the steps necessary to remove a child from abusive parents – 
but it may also be because of failings that are administrative rather than 
professional in nature and cannot be ascribed to any particular individual. 
So, for example, a badly run education authority might fail through simple 
administrative incompetence to make the arrangements necessary to assist 
a child who needs home schooling or the social services department may 
have been informed that a child needs its help but, again, through 
administrative incompetence – because there is a rapid turnover of staff, 
because files are lost and letters or emails left unopened – may have failed 
to take the necessary steps. It would be hard to justify making a finding of 
                                                     
65 Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 
QB 428 (QB). 
66 Smith v Eric S Bush [1990] 1 AC 831 (HL). 
67 Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council (n 25). 
68 See D v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust (n 14). 
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liability in the cases that conformed to the model of vicarious liability for 
failings of professionals while denying it in the cases where the causes of 
harm were of the administrative type.69 
This problem can be avoided if we take the view that professional 
liability is only a special case of assumption of responsibility. We can 
then say that the authorities that employ professionals assume a 
responsibility toward the persons whom they aim to assist. This solution 
brings us back to the problem of omissions, however. As noted above, 
assumption of responsibility, however interpreted, requires some sort of 
positive act on the part of the defendant and yet some of those failures on 
the part of authorities to provide expected services that cannot be ascribed 
to identifiable professionals will also be cases of pure omission. Consider 
again, for instance, the example of the social services department given 
information about a child in danger which fails through sheer 
administrative incompetence to act timeously. In such a case, the 
defendant authority may never make towards the child a gesture that 
could be interpreted as an assumption of responsibility and yet, to refuse 
liability in this case while finding it in another in which a similar failure is 
preceded by such a gesture would be, again, to make an indefensible 
suggestion. 
 
4.5 Legal Determination Cases 
 
Cases which involve the making of legal determinations by public 
authorities as to the rights or entitlements of private persons and in which 
the question of tortious liability arises are rare, but they exist. One such is 
the well-known Maguire case70 in which the claimants fitted out vehicles 
for use as taxis in reliance on a policy promulgated by the local authority 
but were then denied the licences necessary to operate the taxis when the 
policy turned out to be unlawful. Another is the Banks case71 in which the 
claimant was a farmer who suffered financial loss when the Secretary of 
State made his herd the subject of a Movement Restriction Order on the 
basis of a fact-finding process vitiated by procedural impropriety. A third 
example is the Jain case referred to above where the claimants were the 
proprietors of a care home who suffered the ruination of their business 
after the defendant health authority obtained an ex parte court order 
                                                     
69 cf Booth and Squires (n 17) 9.102-9.110. 
70 R v Knowsley MBC, ex p Maguire (1992) 90 LGR 653. 
71 Banks v Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [2004] 
EWHC 416, [2004] NPC 43. 
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cancelling the home’s registration on the basis of inaccurate 
information.72 
It might be thought that in relation to cases of this sort, the concept of 
assumption of responsibility had no relevance at all. Legal determinations 
are the purest form of exercise of public law power and it is widely 
supposed that the functions they involve are too unlike the activities 
undertaken by private persons for it to be possible for negligence to have 
any application. 73  Since assumption of responsibility is a concept 
belonging to the law of negligence, it too is supposed to have no place in 
legal determination cases. Assumption of responsibility would thus appear 
to be relevant only in the sense that there was a kind of negative 
correlation: there is never assumption of responsibility in such cases and, 
correspondingly, there is never a duty of care. For two reasons, this 
appearance is misleading however. 
Firstly, one can make a strong case that wherever a public authority 
makes a legal determination with respect to the rights or entitlements of a 
particular citizen, it assumes a responsibility towards that citizen. All the 
necessary elements are there: the authority acts positively with respect to 
the citizen; the citizen will commonly be reliant or dependent for some 
aspect of her welfare on the authority’s act, or both: and the citizen will be 
aware of this reliance or dependency. In most such cases, moreover, the 
authority’s act can be seen as involving a representation as to the 
authority’s power to perform the act, a representation which amounts to a 
species of negligent misstatement where it turns out to be false. So in 
Maguire, for example, the authority gave the false impression to the 
claimants that they would receive taxi licences and they suffered loss as a 
result while in Banks, the claimant was led to believe that his herd was 
subject to a valid Movement Restriction Order when it was not and 
suffered loss as a result. 
Secondly, parties have attempted to invoke assumption of 
responsibility in a number of cases involving the making of legal 
determinations by public authorities and while the argument has been 
rejected in some cases it has been accepted in others.74 An early example 
                                                     
72 n 15. 
73 This supposition is an expression of what I called in Section I above “the 
background premise”. 
74 Cases in which the argument has been made and rejected are: W v Home Office 
[1997] Imm AR 302; Rowley v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2007] 
EWCA Civ 598, [2007] 1 WLR 2861; St John Poulton’s Trustee in Bankruptcy v 
Minister of Justice [2010] EWCA Civ 392, [2011] Ch 1. In addition to the cases 
 
ASSUMPTION OF RESPONSIBILITY BY PUBLIC AUTHORITIES 
 
 
76 
of a case where the argument succeeded is Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government v Sharp.75  This involved a scheme whereby persons who 
suffered loss as a result of the denial of planning permission were paid 
compensation. If permission were later granted the developer had to repay 
the compensation to the Ministry and this obligation was recorded on the 
local charges register as a local land charge. Under the governing 
legislation, the registrar of local charges was the clerk to the relevant local 
authority. It was his duty to register the charge and where an official 
search was requisitioned, to produce a certificate indicating the charge’s 
existence. The facts were that an owner of land subject to such a charge 
obtained planning permission and sold the land to a developer. Prior to the 
sale, the developer’s solicitor requisitioned a search of the local charges 
register but due to the negligence of a clerk in the registry, the resulting 
certificate made no reference to the charge. As the Court of Appeal held, 
the certificate was conclusive as against the Ministry and the developer 
was thus able to avoid having to pay back the compensation. The Ministry 
sued the local registrar, Sharp, and his employer, the local authority, for 
breach of statutory duty and negligence. The members of the Court of 
Appeal were not able to agree as to whether an action lay for breach of 
statutory duty – Lord Denning MR thought it did while Salmon and Cross 
LJJ thought it did not – but they were able to agree that Sharp was liable 
for negligent misstatement on the principle of Hedley Byrne and his 
employer, the local authority, conceded that it was vicariously liable. 
The case provides a good illustration of the fine line between the 
situation in which an authority causes loss by giving out erroneous 
information (discussed above under the heading “information cases”) and 
the situation in which an authority harms a person by the improper or 
careless exercise of its power to determine legal rights or entitlements. It 
is easy to represent as being an instance of the former: the clerk to the 
local authority mistakenly informed the developer that there was no 
charge and his employer, the local authority, conceded that it was 
vicariously liable for the resulting loss. On a true legal analysis, however, 
it was an instance of the latter. As Lord Denning explained,76 in his role as 
local registrar Sharp was not a servant of the local authority. Qua 
registrar, he was under a statutory duty to provide an accurate certificate 
and the certificate was conclusive as to the existence or not of the charge. 
                                                                                                                        
mentioned in the text, the argument was made and partly accepted in McCreaner 
v Ministry of Justice [2014] EHWC 569 (QB), [2015] 1 WLR 354. 
75 n 37. 
76 At p 265. 
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The registrar’s careless exercise of his power thus had the effect of 
depriving the Ministry of its right to the money secured by the charge. 
The judges of the Court of Appeal fudged or glossed over this difference, 
but we should not allow their equivocation to blind us to true nature of 
their decision. 
Sharp is peculiar in that the right or entitlement in question was that 
of a branch of government. 77  There are other cases in which public 
authorities have been held to assume responsibility in the exercise of 
powers to determine rights or entitlements, however, in which the persons 
affected have been ordinary citizens. One such case is Neil Martin Ltd v 
Revenue and Customs Commissioners.78 The claimant in this case was a 
builder who applied to the Revenue for a certificate which he needed to in 
order to obtain work as a subcontractor. In processing his claim, the 
Revenue made a series of errors with the result that he only obtained the 
certificate after a long delay, thus occasioning loss. The errors included 
wrongly insisting that he had to produce company accounts, failing to 
ensure that he signed the relevant forms while at the tax office, mistakenly 
treating the forms submitted by the claimant as an application for 
something other than the required certificate, marking a second set of 
forms with the wrong Unique Tax Reference, and sending the certificate 
once granted to the wrong address. The Court of Appeal held that the third 
of these errors, but not the others, gave rise to a duty of care: in deciding 
to treat the claimant’s application as an application for something other 
than the sought after certificate, the anonymous employee had assumed a 
responsibility towards the claimant and the Revenue was vicariously 
liable for its breach.  
Another example is Welton v North Cornwall District Council.79 Here, 
the owners of a guest house made expensive improvements to their 
premises on the advice of an environmental health officer given when the 
officer paid them an informal visit. The improvements turned out not to 
be required under the relevant legislation. On the owners’ action for 
recovery of the wasted expenses, the Court of Appeal held that the officer 
had, in effect, been offering an advisory service and could thus owe a duty 
of care to the owners and be liable for negligent misstatement. In reaching 
its judgment, the court emphasized the informal nature of the officer’s 
visit and characterized the giving of advice as beyond the officer’s 
                                                     
77 Moreover, if the registrar could be represented as making a direct undertaking 
to anyone it would be to the person seeking the certificate.  
78 [2007] EWCA Civ 1041; [2007] All ER (D) 897. 
79 [1997] 1 WLR 570. 
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statutory functions. The case might thus appear to fall outside the category 
of cases involving the making of a legal determination as to rights or 
entitlement. As Lord Scott VC pointed out when he distinguished Welton 
in another case, 80  however, the officer’s giving of advice could not 
plausibly be differentiated from his statutory functions in this way. The 
plaintiffs did what he told them to do not simply because he was an expert 
on the subject who had proffered advice but because he had coercive 
powers which they believed he would use against them: the officer’s 
giving of advice in this context was itself an exercise of coercive power. 
The case thus concerns the exercise of a public authority’s powers to 
determine rights, despite the Court of Appeal’s attempt to make it appear 
otherwise. 
It is, of course, a noteworthy feature of these cases that the courts 
never admit that a public authority making a determination as to rights or 
entitlements can, in so doing, make an assumption of responsibility. In 
each case, the court pretends that some employee of the authority has 
somehow stepped outside its statutory function and performed an act of 
the sort that would involve assumption of responsibility if performed by a 
private person. Justifications have occasionally been advanced in the case 
law for the view that assumption of responsibility is incompatible with the 
performance of a statutory function. One is that where a public authority 
is subject to a statutory duty to act it cannot be said to have assumed 
responsibility towards those affected by its action because it was not 
acting voluntarily. 81  This insistence that a person can only assume 
responsibility in relation to acts which she is not legally obliged on other 
grounds to perform is inconsistent with the definition of assumption of 
responsibility I set out above, however. It assumes a reading of 
“voluntary” as entailing freedom of choice whereas, in a number of 
leading cases, defendants have been found to have assumed responsibility 
despite being under a legal obligation to perform the act to which 
assumption relates.82 To define assumption of responsibility in this way, 
                                                     
80 Harris v Evans (n 14). 
81 See Customs and Excise Commissioners v Barclays Bank Plc (n 30) [14] (Lord 
Bingham), [94] (Lord Mance) respectively; Neil Martin Ltd v Revenue and 
Customs Commissioners [2006] EWHC 2425 (Ch) 97 (Andrew Simmons); 
Rowley v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (n 74) [54] (Dyson LJ); 
Darby v Richmond upon Thames LBC [2017] EWCA Civ 252 [18] (Thirlwall 
LJ). 
82 See Barrett v Enfield LBC and Phelps v Hillingdon LBC, both (n 25), in both of 
which the defendant public authorities were held to owe duties vicariously as a 
result of actions performed by the professionals they employed while at the same 
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moreover, would have the consequence that the concept could not be used 
to explain the incidence of the duty of care in cases involving public 
authorities since most public authority cases in which an assumption of 
responsibility may be found are ones in which the authority is obliged by 
statute to perform some action vis-à-vis the claimant.83  
The conventional picture I presented above of the role that assumption 
of responsibility might play in legal determination cases is thus false. It is 
not true that there is never a duty of care in such cases, nor that the 
concept of assumption of responsibility is not or cannot be used. The 
concept has been used in some cases. The courts have tried to make it 
appear that these cases did not truly involve the exercise of powers to 
determine citizens’ rights or entitlements but typically they did involve 
such exercise. If the concept were used consistently, moreover, it would 
justify imposing a duty of care in many and perhaps the great majority of 
legal determination cases. Its use cannot, therefore, be said to justify by 
itself the current pattern of liability and no liability in such cases. This 
prompts the question whether assumption of responsibility, in 
combination with one or more of the exclusionary principles discussed 
above might produce a pattern like that to be found in the actual case law. 
In particular, one might ask whether the use of assumption of 
responsibility together with what I called above the fourth proposition – 
namely that a putative duty should be excluded if it would be in conflict 
with the other duties to which the defendant public duty was subject – 
might produce a pattern of liability like that in the case law. 
The answer is that it would not. The legal determination cases in 
which a duty has been found are ones in which the courts have been able 
to delude themselves that determination of rights or entitlements was not 
involved, either by pretending that the relevant acts could be attributed to 
an employee rather than to the authority itself or that the authority was 
simply dispensing information. These cases are not ones in which the 
possibility that a duty of care would conflict with the authority’s other 
public law duties was less present than in cases in which no duty was 
found. In Neil Martin, for example, a duty on the part of the tax 
                                                                                                                        
time being under statutory obligations to act. In a non-public authority context, 
see Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd (No 1) (n 45), in which an assumption of 
authority arose on the basis of conduct undertaken in fulfilment of a contractual 
obligation to a third party and Spring v Guardian Assurance Plc [1995] 2 AC 296 
(HL), where an assumption of authority was held to arise in relation to an act 
required by the defendant’s membership of a self-regulatory body. cf Nolan ‘The 
Liability of Public Authorities for Failing to Confer Benefits’ (n 5) 283. 
83 As in Barrett and Phelps (n 25). 
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authorities to correctly determine the claimant’s tax status could 
presumably be said to have conflicted with its duties to do the same for 
other tax payers and to obtain the maximum tax take for the treasury 
while in the Welton case, a duty on the part of the health inspector to take 
care in determining the guest house owners’ obligation under the relevant 
legislation could be said to have conflicted with his duty to protect the 
interests of potential customers of the guest house in health and safety. 
The idea of a duty of care based on assumption of responsibility and 
limited where necessary to avoid conflicting duties also has a serious 
deficiency from a normative or justificatory point of view. If the typical 
legal determination case involves an assumption of responsibility and is 
therefore on all fours with the typical professional case, why should the 
need to avoid conflicts between duties exclude liability in relation to the 
former and not in relation to the latter? It might be thought that what 
distinguishes the two types of cases is that legal determination cases 
usually involve difficult decisions as to the allocation of resources 
whereas, in professional cases, once a professional person (whether public 
or private) has assumed responsibility towards an individual the only 
issues that arise relate to practical competence in the provision of the 
service offered. This distinction will not withstand examination, however. 
Even once a public sector professional has chosen to serve a given 
individual, the choices she makes in providing the service will have 
resource implications and involve choices that affect other persons to 
whom she might owe a duty. An NHS doctor must balance the time spent 
in administering a treatment to a particular patient against the time to be 
spent in treating other patients and to attach a duty of care to one patient 
might be thought to produce a conflict with the duties owed to others; in 
preparing a statement for a pupil with special educational needs, an 
education officer will make recommendations having implications vis-à-
vis the resources that can be spent on other pupils;84 and a social worker 
deciding whether to place a child in care with a foster family and which 
foster family to choose owes conflicting duties to both the child and the 
foster families concerned.85 The choices to be made in these cases do not 
involve matters of high policy and in the first and second of these 
examples, the exclusionary principle involved – i.e. that there should not 
be a duty of care towards a particular individual where the authority 
concerned owes a duty to all members of the public who share the 
                                                     
84 cf Phelps (n 25); Carty v Croydon LBC [2005] EWCA Civ 19, [2005] 1WLR 
2312. 
85 Barrett v Enfield LBC (n 25); W v Essex CC [2001] 2 AC 592. 
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situation of the individual in question - is one I represented above as a 
tendency rather than an absolute rule. Nonetheless, if we compare the 
potential conflicts of duties involved in such cases with those in the case 
in which Lord Scott’s strict exclusionary principle was enunciated, there 
seems no reason to allow a duty of care in the former while excluding it in 
the latter. The failure in Jain was to take reasonable care in ascertaining 
the facts when deciding whether to apply for the cancellation of a care 
home’s licence. No hard question of policy was involved here either and 
if a health authority cannot be put under a duty of care for fear that it 
might not cancel a care home’s licence when the protection of the 
occupants’ well-being made it necessary to do so, it is hard to see how we 
can be confident that imposition of a duty of care might not have an 
equally distorting effect on a doctor deciding which treatment to 
administer, an education officer recommending special educational 
provision or a social worker deciding to recommend that a child be placed 
with a foster family. 
Thus the recognition that many legal determination cases might 
involve an assumption of responsibility on the part of the public authority 
concerned tends to point up the arbitrariness of the principles of blanket 
exclusion adopted in recent case law. A more defensible method of 
determining the incidence of the duty of care in legal determination cases 
would be to assume its prima facie existence and limit it by reference to 
any deleterious consequences that its imposition seemed likely to have. 
But it is precisely to avoid such an approach – essentially the one set out 
in Anns v Merton Borough Council86 – that the current dispensation has 
been adopted. 
A final question is whether an approach to legal determination cases 
based on the consistent application of assumption of responsibility might 
produce satisfactory outcomes even if those were not the outcomes to be 
found in current case law. Having surveyed all categories of public 
authority cases, however, we are now in a position to see that the 
consistent application of the concept of assumption of responsibility 
would produce across the whole range of public authority cases an 
incidence of the duty of care far more extensive than usually 
contemplated by the concept’s proponents. The question whether use of 
the concept in relation to legal determination cases is better addressed as 
part of the larger issue of whether its use can produce a pattern of 
satisfactory outcomes for public authority cases as a whole and 
accordingly I postpone it to this article’s conclusion.  
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5 CONCLUSION 
 
The concept of assumption of responsibility cannot be used to explain 
or justify those parts of the law on the negligence liability of public 
authorities to which it appears to have application. As we have seen, there 
are various anomalies for which it cannot account.  
But if it cannot explain or justify the current law could its consistent 
application result in something better? One might, speculate on this basis 
that assumption of responsibility could form the foundation for a more 
extensive law of public authority negligence and that in doing so it might 
cure what many have for long felt to be a defect in English law, the lack 
of a developed form of administrative liability. Such a development 
would be supported by the principle enunciated by Lord Bingham. It 
should not surprise us if the consistent application of assumption of 
responsibility produces the kinds of outcomes required by that principle. 
As noted above, the paradigm example of assumption of responsibility is 
the offer of help to a member of the public by a qualified professional. 
What distinguishes a professional person from any other provider of 
services is professed expertise and a commitment to serving the public 
interest. A professional is thus very like a public authority and in some 
systems is treated as one. What the discussion above has demonstrated, 
however, is that while a law of public authority negligence liability based 
on assumption of responsibility might be far more extensive than the 
concept’s proponents envisage, it would still suffer from unjustifiable 
lacunae as a result of the requirement that a person act positively in order 
to assume responsibility. Hence, as we saw, the fire brigade that attends a 
fire and incompetently fails to put it out would be liable while the fire 
brigade that unreasonably omits to attend would not; the social services 
department that apprised itself of the facts relating to an abused child and 
negligently failed to remove the child from her abusive parents would be 
liable while the social services department that negligently failed to take 
notice of the child’s situation in the first place would not; and so on. If 
one were minded to use negligence as the vehicle for a developed form of 
administrative liability, one would therefore be better off relying on the 
Bingham principle directly than using assumption of responsibility as a 
kind of proxy. 
Faced with the inadequacy of the concept of assumption of 
responsibility, there are a number of possible responses. One is to 
continue the so far fruitless search for some concept that is, on the one 
hand, consistent with the basic principle that public authorities are to be 
treated as if they were private persons but that, on the other hand, avoids 
the harsh or seemingly unjust results to which the principle otherwise 
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gives rise.87 Another is to adhere to the principle that public authorities 
must be treated in the same way as private persons while simply accepting 
that this produces harsh and unjust results. A third response would to be to 
abandon the dogmatic adherence to Dicey’s equality principle and to 
accept at last that English law requires a form of specialized 
administrative liability, one based overtly on the principle that there 
should be compensation for the misdeeds of public authorities. 
With respect to this last possibility, one final observation is in order. 
In my description at the beginning of this article of the current state of the 
law in this area, I outlined what I called “the background premise” namely 
the view that a public authority acting in the exercise of a public law 
power or in pursuit of public law duty can never owe a duty of care except 
when it attracts such a duty by performing an activity that might equally 
well be performed by a private person. In other words, even if it might 
appear desirable to extend a principle that applies to private defendants in 
such a way as to impose a duty of care upon a public authority in relation 
to some activity that lacks an obvious private counterpart, it is somehow 
never appropriate to do so. The approach of the courts to what I called 
above legal determination cases tends to confirm the existence of the 
background premise. In a number of such cases, the courts have justified 
the imposition of a duty of care by assimilating the acts of the defendant 
public authority to ones that might be carried out by a private person.88 
Where such assimilation is not possible, however, or where the courts are 
clear sighted enough to recognize that the case involves the making of a 
legal determination, despite the superficial resemblance to an activity that 
might be carried out by a private person, then a duty of care is denied.89 
What justification is there for this state of affairs? None is to be found 
in the case law. Instead, the courts present us with a series of ad hoc 
excuses for restricting liability without ever providing or even 
                                                     
87 The notion of “general reliance” propounded by Mason J in Sutherland Shire 
Council v Heyman (1987) 157 CLR 424 and discussed by Lord Hoffmann in 
Stovin v Wise (n 24) 953-55 has been considered for this purpose but with little 
success. More commonly, adherents of Dicey’s equality principle tend to deny 
that there is any special problem of public authority liability and look instead for 
principles that will explain why there should be liability in cases (whether with 
public or private defendants) involving omissions. For a useful exposition of such 
principles see H Wilberg, ‘In Defence of The Omissions Rule in Public Authority 
Negligence Claims’ (2011) 19 TLJ 159. 
88 As in Barrett (n 25); Phelps (n 25); Sharp (n 37); Neil Martin (n 81); Welton (n 
79). 
89 n 74. 
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acknowledging the need for a global explanation for the refusal to provide 
compensation in relation to loss caused by distinctively public law 
functions. One is left with the sense that the English legal system’s lack of 
a developed form of administrative liability is the product of nothing more 
than a blind fearfulness and conservatism. 
 
